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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
Humanity stands at the confluence of raging rivers created by its own hand:
population growth that demands economic growth, rapidly changing technology
that spawns myriad new products, increased trade that spreads these products across
1996]
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the globe, and burgeoning environmental degradation that threatens global
biospheric cycles. How we steer the ship of humanity through this confluence will
determine our standards of living and environmental quality for generations.
One industry that flows within all these currents is that of motor vehicles.
As a major sector of industrial economies, the motor vehicle industry has achieved
maturity in the industrial world. We currently drive about 450 million automobiles,
100 million commercial vehicles, and at least 100 million two- and three-wheeled
vehicles.' According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), seventy-five percent of vehicles are owned by fifteen
percent of the world's population, mostly in the industrialized countries.2
In the developing world, the industry is growing rapidly. Many developing
countries have engaged in production, often in partnership with large firms, and
most developing countries desire to obtain more cars. For example, in China, new
car sales have jumped from 78,000 in 1990 to 430,000 in 1994.' DRI McGraw-Hill
forecasts sales of one million cars by 1999.4
While increased demand presents great opportunities for vehicle
manufacturers, the prospect of such motor vehicle growth brings the specter of
additional air pollution. Besides the traditional problems of "smog" and
particulates,5 motor vehicles contribute substantially to greenhouse gases.6
Vehicle emission standards and fuel standards are critical determinants of
the environmental and health impact of the expected increase in vehicles. Such
standards also play a crucial role in the marketplace because they may be barriers
to trade.7 On the other hand, harmonization of such standards could lead to
'Haig Simonian, Drive for the Clean, Lean Car, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Drive
for the Clean, Lean Car].
2 Drive for the Clean, Lean Car, supra note I.
Kevin Done, East Offers Best Outlook for Growth, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at.11 [hereinafter East
Offers Best Outlook].
4 Id.
For example, in 1990, highway vehicles (including passenger cars, light-duty trucks, heavy-duty
gasoline engine trucks, and heavy-duty diesel engine trucks) were responsible for a substantial
proportion of anthropogenic air pollutant emissions in the United States-specifically, 50.4% of
carbon monoxide, 27.3% of volatile organic compounds, 28.6% of nitrogen oxides, and 19% of fine
particles (PMO, meaning particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter). See MOTOR VEHICLE
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS & FIGURES '92
84 (1992) [hereinafter FACTS & FIGURES '92], citing U.S. EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION
ESTIMATES, 1940-1990 (Nov. 1991).
6 See generally IPCC (WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION/UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE), CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990).
7 In a related example, the United States and Japan engaged in a heated battle over trade in automobiles
and automotive parts in 1995 after the failure of two years of negotiations. Bernard Simon, US-Japan
Car Talks Run Out of Road, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at 4. One key dispute was whether Japan's
elaborate automobile inspection system served more to restrict imports from foreign firms than it
served to prevent traffic accidents. Id. Just as the Japanese inspection system acts as a barrier to entry,
whether or not it has unrelated legitimate reasons for existing, stringent emission standards can be a
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economies of scale and efficiencies leading to positive economic welfare effects.
Will harmonization of vehicle emission standards occur? If so, will such
harmonization be upwards, toward greater stringency, or downwards, toward the
"lowest common denominator?" To build an analytical framework for answering
these questions under different international trading regimes, this article explores
the past and potential harmonization of automobile and light truck emission
standards under three trading regimes-the European Union ("EU" or "Union"), 8
the World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("WTO/GATT") and the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). This
initial effort should provide a framework for future research, and ultimately
guidance, for policymakers, firms, and interest groups.
B. Summary of Conclusions
Based on the analysis of automobile emission standards in the European
Union, I conclude that several critical factors influence a trading regime's approach
toward the tension between free trade and internal regulations, and the direction of
harmonization, if any. These factors are: large consumer markets, supplier
preferences, state power, domestic political support, and the structure of the
international regime and its institutions. In the EC, West Germany, which had
power due to its political and economic position, in general, and its large and
attractive market, in particular, led the drive for more stringent emission standards
and cleaner fuels. Along with the help of other "greener" states and the rise in
influence of environmentalists in recalcitrant states, EU standards gradually became
more stringent. The EU used several approaches to achieve upward harmonization:
(1) compromise through product differentiation, (2) threats from the largest market
and the dominant political player, and (3) federalization/centralization.
In contrast, for the World Trade Organization, neither the market dynamics
nor the relatively weak WTO/GATT structure will reproduce the upward
harmonization seen in Western Europe. Instead, stringent domestic rules may be
challenged by: (1) existing major producers to knock down maverick countries
with high standards, or (2) infant producers seeking to export to the more advanced
countries.
Finally, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, the United States
will continue to dominate the setting of vehicle emission standards and fuel quality
standards. Because automobile manufacturing in Mexico is operated by U.S. and
Asian firms (or joint ventures thereof), independent Mexican firms are not a
significant factor in influencing emission standards. The U.S. and Asian firms
already must meet stringent standards for export to the United States. The only
barrier to entry.
8 Since much of the case study takes place prior to the change in name from the European
Communities ("EC") to the European Union ("EU"), the term EC is used frequently herein. Similarly,
"West Germany" is used for the Federal Republic of Germany prior to German reunification in 1990.
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question is whether it will be profitable and desirable to manufacture less-controlled
("dirtier") cars for the Mexican and South American markets. To the extent that the
United States exerts pressure on Mexico to harmonize its standards, production of
dirtier cars for the Mexican market is less likely.
Advice for participants in the policy debate flows from this analysis.
Manufacturers should assess possible economies of scale that might be achieved
under harmonized standards. (Of course, a manufacturing firm may conclude
harmonization is not in its interest due to limited ability to pass increased costs per
vehicle onto consumers.) Environmentalists should strive to obtain stringent
standards in large markets for the product. Strict standards in these markets (such
as California and West Germany, for automobiles) will facilitate upward
harmonization, where firms desire to serve these markets.
Beyond these conclusions, this article provides a road map for assessing the
probability of harmonization of environmental standards under various international
trading regimes for a selected economic sector. To make this assessment, the
analyst must gather information regarding the legal and institutional structure of the
trading regime, the major producers and markets, and domestic and international
politics.
C. Scope and Organization
The scope of this case study includes emission standards for both
automobiles and light-duty trucks that operate on gasoline.9 This study excludes
heavy-duty trucks and buses, which bum diesel fuel, because the adoption of
emission regulations for trucks and buses follows a parallel but different path. The
study period begins in 1970, when regulation of vehicle emissions first began in
earnest in Europe, and extends to the mid-1990s.
Part II lays out the legal, economic, and political framework for the vehicle
exhaust emissions case in Western Europe. It discusses the world motor vehicle
market and the EC motor vehicle market. Part III lays out the history of vehicle
exhaust emissions policy in the EC from 1970 to the mid-1990s. Part III also
analyzes the EC case to determine what key factors influenced the degree and
direction of harmonization in the EC. Part IV lays out the legal, economic, and
political framework for automobile exhaust emissions regulation under the
WTO/GATT and evaluates the potential for harmonization under this regime.
Similarly, Part V discusses the underlying features of NAFTA and its markets and
then evaluates the potential for harmonization. The NAFTA discussion is last
because NAFTA adopts many elements of the WTO/GATT which are easier to
understand after discussion of the WTO/GATT. In addition, although NAFTA is
an intermediate level of economic integration between the EU and the WTO, the
' References to "the market" mean the market for passenger automobiles and light trucks. For ease
of reading, references to "motor vehicles" or "vehicles" mean only automobiles and light-duty trucks,
unless otherwise stated.
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NAFTA analysis is the simplest due to its members and market structure. Finally,
Part VI provides overall conclusions.
II. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE AUTOMOBILE
EXHAUST EMISSIONS CASE IN EUROPE
A. Legal Framework.- Instruments of European Integration and Their Effect on
Environmental Regulation
1. The Treaty of Rome
In 1957, six western European states signed the Treaty of Rome, thereby
forming the beginning of a customs union called the European Economic
Community. I" The six signatories agreed to eliminate tariffs between member
states and establish a common tariff to imports from outside the group.
The Treaty of Rome contains no mention of environmental standards,
presumably because these were not deemed terribly important, as trade barriers or
otherwise, at the time. Nevertheless, as member states fashioned their own
environmental regulations in the early 1970s and subsequent years, the EC also
adopted a variety of environmental regulations and directives.
Most environmental directives were arguably justified under Article 100
of the treaty, which permits action by the Community in response to an existing
state measure that affects the functioning of the common market." The European
Commission and the European Parliament generally held Article 100 to be an
adequate source of authority. 2 In areas bearing some relationship to economic
activities, but less clearly linked to the common market, the EC relied upon Article
235."
'0 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I 1
[hereinafter EEC TREATY].
" Article 100 of the EEC Treaty provides: "The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a
proposal of the Commission, shall issue directives for the approximation of such legislative and
administrative provisions of the Member States as have a direct influence on the establishment or
functioning of the Common Market .... EEC TREATY art. 100.
2 Dirk Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European
Economic Community, 12 EuR. L. REv. 407, 410 (1987). In 1980, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities held that Article 100 could be a basis for environmental policy if linked to the need to
preserve the common market. See Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099, 1106, cited
in Vandermeersch, supra, at 410 n.13.
'3 Article 235 of the EEC Treaty provides:
If action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the
Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this treaty has
not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of
a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has
been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.
EEC TREATY art. 235. Vandermeersch explains that the wording in Article 100 compared to that in
Article 235 supports the view that this link need not be as close. See Vandermeersch, supra note 12,
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Because the Treaty of Rome provided no explicit guidance regarding the
level of environmental protection desired, when tradeoffs had to be made between
economic integration and the environment, integration tended to win. Critics
charged that many EC environmental directives reflected the "lowest common
denominator of national regulations."'4
2. The Single European Act of 1987
The members amended the Treaty of Rome in 1987 by enacting the Single
European Act ("S.E.A."). 5 The S.E.A. serves several key functions: it further
integrates the common market; it codifies environmental policy goals; and it allows
more stringent environmental regulation in "greener" members. The latter two
functions are of concern here.
Article 130r declares as environmental objectives the protection of the
environment and human health, and prudent use of natural resources. 6 This
declaration fills the "environmental policy gap" of the original treaty. Furthermore,
the new Article 100a sets "a high level of protection" as the goal when the
Commission undertakes health, safety, environmental, and consumer protection. 7
Finally, Article 130r dictates that "[e]nvironmental protection requirements shall
be a component of the Community's other policies."'" This article has the practical
effect of strengthening the position of the Commission's Environmental Directorate
("DG XI") in its battles with other Directorates.' 9
A crucial effect of the S.E.A. for vehicle emissions regulation was to
replace the previous rule of consensus with qualified majority voting for Council
decisions in certain areas.2" This replacement allowed the majority to overrule
Denmark regarding the Luxembourg Compromise.2'
B. World Automobile Market Structure
Both the world and European automobile markets are important to this
analysis because export patterns and the U.S. auto emission standards played an
at 411. However, the apparent incongruity between the EEC Treaty and Vandermeersch's statement
is a mystery.
4 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 60 (1995).
11 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1-28.
16 Article 130r, para. I, provides: "Action by the Community relating to the environment shall have
the following objectives: to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment; to contribute
towards protecting human health and; to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources."
EEC TREATY art. 130r, para. I (as amended 1987).
17 See id. art. 100a (as in effect in 1987).
"s See id art. 130r, para. 2 (as amended 1987).
19 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 60.
'0 See EEC TREATY art. 149 (as in effect in 1987).
"1 See infra part 1l1.B.4.
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influential role in the European standards debate. The following sections discuss
world and regional demand and supply, including the major producers and the most
important markets.
i. Demand
Historically, the big automobile and light truck markets have been North
America, Western Europe, and Japan. While the United States was the largest
market in the first half of the century, demand in Western Europe and Japan rose
dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s.22 Furthermore, U.S. consumers demanded
more Japanese and European automobiles during the late 1970s and early 1980s due
to the fuel inefficiency and the lower quality of U.S.-made vehicles. Thus, Western
European and Japanese production blossomed to fulfill both domestic and foreign
demand.
In the future, the greatest increase in vehicle consumption is likely to occur
in the developing countries, especially in Asia. According to Alex Trotman,
chairman and chief executive of Ford Motor Company, about eighty percent of the
world's population lives outside the traditional markets (i.e., North America,
Western Europe, and Japan), but only consumes about eight percent of current car
and truck production.23 Trotman forecasts Asian markets (outside Japan) to hold
the most promise for future sales growth.24 This forecast has important implications
for future vehicle trade and emissions standards.
2. Supply and Location of Production and Assembly Facilities
In describing motor vehicle supply, one must distinguish carefully between
statistics for motor vehicle production by region and by manufacturer. These
statistics have diverged substantially in recent years due to construction of plants
in foreign countries. Furthermore, the trend toward foreign investment has
important implications for harmonization of environmental standards.
By region, prior to 1958, the United States produced more than half the
motor vehicles in the world." In 1967, Europe overtook the United States in
number of vehicles produced and has remained the largest regional producer ever
26 2since. In 1980, Japan overtook the United States in production,27 in part due to the
higher fuel efficiency of Japanese cars after the second oil price shock (1979-1980).
22 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., WORLD MOTOR
VEHICLE DATA 4 (1994) [hereinafter WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994].
23 Kevin Done, Car Producers Race for Global Presence, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, (World Car
Industry) at I.
24 Id.
25 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., MOTOR VEHICLE
FACTS & FIGURES '80 18 (1980).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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In 1991, Europe produced 38% of the world's 46.4 million vehicles, while
Japan made 28%, North America made 25%, and other countries made the
remaining 9%.28 Table I shows world motor vehicle production statistics by region
for selected years.
TABLE 1: MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION BY REGION/NATION' 9
(in millions of motor vehicles)
Year World North N. U.S. West. Eur. West Japan Japan
Amer- Am. Eur. % of Germ. % of
ica % of world world
world
1974 26.0 8.7 34% 7.3 N/A N/A 2.8 3.9 15%
1979 41.5 13.4 32% 11.5 16.4 39% 3.9 6.2 15%
1983 39.8 10.9 27% 9.2 15.9 40% 3.9 11.1 28%
1987 45.7 12.7 28% 10.9 17.6 39% 4.3 12.2 27%
1991 46.4 11.7 25% 8.8 17.6 38% 4.6 13.2 28%
In the late 1970s and 1980s, vehicle makers engaged in foreign joint
ventures and spread manufacturing and assembly operations to foreign countries.30
Volkswagen built its first car in the United States in 1978.31 U.S., Japanese, and
European multinational corporations had production facilities in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, and Belgium.32 Renault formed deep ties with
American Motors Corporation.33 The Japanese ventured into the United States, with
Honda facilities in Ohio, Nissan in Tennessee, and Mazda in Michigan.34
By 1985, nearly all U.S. firms owned substantial shares in Asian
manufacturers. 35 For example, General Motors Corporation ("GM") started a joint
venture with Toyota in California, and GM had a strong interest in Isuzu and
Suzuki.36 Ford Motor Company became a partial owner of Mazda.37  Chrysler
21 FACTS & FIGURES '92, supra note 5, at 11.
29 American Automobile Manufacturers Association statistics (formerly MVMA, see notes in text).
'0 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., MOTOR VEHICLE
FACTS & FIGURES '85 2 (1985) [hereinafter FACTS & FIGURES '851.
31 Id.
32 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 63.
33 FACTS & FIGURES '85, supra note 3 1, at 2.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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invested in Mitsubishi. 8
Therefore, by manufacturer, market shares are different than the regional
production figures discussed above. North American companies dominated firms
from other regions until the late 1980s, as shown in Table 2. Western European
firms overtook North American firms recently to claim about one-third of the world
market. Japanese firms also rose to about one-third of the market.
TABLE 2: MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION BY GROUPS OF MANUFACTURERS39
(in millions of motor vehicles)
Year World North North Amer. Western Europe Japan Japan
American % of world Europe % of Firms % of
Firms Firms world world
1983 39.8 14.1 35% 10.4 26% 11.2 28%
1986 45.2 16.4 36% 11.1 24% 12.9 28%
1990 35.8 9.8 27% 11.1 31% 11.5 32%
C. European Vehicle Market Structure
The following sections discuss European demand and supply, including the
major producers, the relative market sizes, and trading patterns.
1. Demand
As mentioned above, demand in Western Europe rose dramatically in the
1960s and 1970s.4° Table 3 shows new passenger car registrations over the last two
decades for the largest four markets: Germany, 41 Italy, France, and the United
Kingdom. The medium-sized markets are Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, and Greece.42 The small markets are
38 Id.
3" Id. Years differ due to source availability. Data not available for earlier years.
40 WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 4.
4' It is assumed that the source data provides only West German data prior to unification.
42 New registrations (in thousands) for 1991 for Western European countries are, in descending order:
Germany (4,159); Italy (2,220); France (2,031); United Kingdom (1,599); Spain (887); the
Netherlands (491); Belgium (462); Switzerland (310); Austria (304); Portugal (231); Sweden (188);
Greece (167); Finland (92); Denmark (84); Ireland (69); Norway (53); and Luxembourg (39). Data
for the 1970s and i 980s is not readily available. WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22,
at98, 105, 108, 117, 132, 158, 164, 170, 186, 188, 192, 201,209, 217, 239, 256.
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Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Luxembourg.43
TABLE 3: NEW PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN
NATIONS
44
(in millions)
Year Total West West Fr. Fr. % U.K. U.K. Italy Italy
of 4 Germ. Germ. of the %of % of
%of 4 the 4 the 4
the 4
1974 5.7 1.7 30% 1.5 27% 1.2 21% 1.3 22%
1979 7.7 2.6 34% 2.0 26% 1.7 22% 1.4 18%
1983 7.7 2.4 31% 2.0 26% 1.8 23% 1.5 19%
1987 9.0 2.9 32% 2.1 24% 2.0 23% 1.9 21%
1991 10.0 4.2 42% 2.0 20% 1.6 16% 2.2 22%
For Western Europe
111991 11 13.5 11 4.2 1 31% 11 2.0 1 15% 11 1.6 1 12% 11 2.2 16%
Germany has the most market power because its demand was thirty-one
percent of the total European market in 1991. 41 Italy, France, and the United
Kingdom together composed an additional forty-three percent.46 Thus, we can
expect vehicle manufacturers that export to the European market to be quite
concerned about domestic vehicle emission standards in these four countries.
2. Supply
During the study period, 1970 to the mid-I 990s, there were producers in
several but not all of the EC member states, with the largest domestic firms in West
Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Table 4 shows annual passenger car production
4' See supra, note 42.
44 Id. at 114, 132, 158, 186, 256. Data for EC/EU as a whole is not readily available. For 1991,
passenger car registrations in Western Europe were 13.5 million. (This includes more than just EU.
Id. at 114).
41 See supra Table 3.
46 See supra Table 3.
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for West Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom for selected years.47
West Germany and France together comprise over half of the total production in
Western Europe.
TABLE 4: PASSENGER CAR PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN NATIONS 48
(in millions)
Year Total West West Fr. Fr. % U.K. U.K. Italy Italy
of 4 Germ. Germ. of the %of %of
%of 4 the 4 the 4
the 4
1974 8.7 2.8 33% 2.7 31% 1.5 18% 1.6 19%
1979 9.7 3.9 41% 3.2 33% 1.1 11% 1.5 15%
1983 9.3 3.9 42% 3.0 32% 1.0 11% 1.4 15%
1987 10.3 4.4 43% 3.1 30% 1.1 11% 1.7 17%
1991 10.7 4.7 43% 3.2 30% 1.2 12% 1.6 15%
For Western Europe
119911 12.7 1 4.7 37% 3.2 25% 0% .6 13%
In 1991, national production of passenger cars was, in millions: West
Germany (4.7), France (3.2), Spain (1.8), Italy (1.6), United Kingdom (1.2),
Belgium (0.3), and the Netherlands (0.08).' 9 The following paragraphs provide an
overview of the manufacturers and their production quantities in 1991, a year for
which useful data are available.5"
The German manufacturers producing more than 500,000 cars in 1991 were
Volkswagen (almost 1.5 million units), Opel, Ford, Daimler-Benz, and BMW."'
Smaller firms were Audi (about 450,000 units) and Porsche (about 20,000),
4' Because most Spanish firms are joint ventures or investments from firms in the other countries,
Spain is not featured in Table 4.
41 WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 112, 113, 120, 141, 173, 246. Data for
EC/EU as a whole is not readily available. For 1991, passenger car production in Western Europe was
12.7 million. (This includes more than just EU. Id. at 113.)
49 Id. at 109-11.
o Although it would be helpful to have export data from the crucial late 1970s and 1980s, the best
data available are from the early 1990s.
"' Id. at 144.
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followed by other very minor firms.52 Opel is a European brand name of GM. 3
France and Spain contain a number of large firms. French firms include
Peugeot S.A. (with over 1.8 million units in 1991), Renault (1.4 million units), and
Citroen (700,000 units).54 Spanish production is dominated by foreign firms:
Group Seat-VW-Audi, GM, Ford, Fasa-Renault, and Group PSA 5 All produced
between 248,000 and 528,000 units in 1991.6
The Italian firms are dominated by Fiat, with nearly 1.2 million units in
1991." In addition, there were several producers of less than 200,000 units in 1991:
Alfa Romeo, Lancia, and Autobianchi. Tiny specialty firms include Innocenti,
Ferrari, Maserati, and Lamborghini.59
The preeminent British car manufacturers are the Rover Group (Austin
Rover and Land Rover), Ford, and Vauxhall (GM), all with between 250,000 and
400,000 units in 1991.60 Smaller producers include Nissan, Peugeot/Talbot,
Jaguar/Daimler, and miscellaneous others.6'
Foreign producers make or assemble about 900,000 cars in Belgium-in
other words, about twice as many cars as the domestic Belgian market consumes.62
The firms in Belgium include GM (about 370,000 cars in 1992), Ford Werke,
Volkswagen, Renault, Volvo, and Apal.63
In the Netherlands, only Volvo has passenger car facilities.64 Denmark, a
major voice in the auto emissions debate, has no production facilities.
3. Trade
One of the significant factors in the European vehicle emission standards
debate was the extent to which European manufacturers exported to the United
States because the United States had more stringent emissions limits.65 Up through
1985, virtually the only countries to export to the United States were Japan, Canada,
52 Id. All lists of manufacturers in specified countries are shown in descending order of passenger
vehicle production in 1991, unless otherwise stated.
13 GM also uses the brand name Vauxhall in Germany. Kevin Done, Espace-the Final Frontier, FIN.
TiMEs, Apr. 12, 1995, at 14.
-4 WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 126.
55 ld. at 213.
56 Id.
11 Id. at 175.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id at 247. In 1986, the Rover Group and Ford were about the same size, but Vauxhall (GM) was
smaller. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 100.
63 Shown in order of passenger vehicle production in 1992. Id.
I Production dropped from about 125,000 in 1987, to 85,000 in 1991. Id. at 191.
63 See infra Appendix Table A-I, for U.S. passenger car emission limits over time.
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and Western European countries.' In 1985, the exporters of passenger cars to the
United States were, in descending order: Japan (2.5 million), Canada (I. I million),
West Germany (473,000), Sweden (143,000), France (40,000), the United Kingdom
(24,000), Belgium (10,000), Italy (9,000), and others (24,000).7
To illustrate European exports to the American market more fully, Table
5 shows passenger car exports to the United States for selected countries and
selected years.6" The table shows that West Germany's stake in exporting to the
United States was much higher than the other countries'. Approximately half of
German exports were to the United States. 9 Almost half of these exports were to
California, which had the strictest regulations in the world." These firms also
exported luxury vehicles to Japan.
TABLE 5: ExPORTS OF PASSENGER CARS TO THE UNITED STATES FOR SELECTED
EUROPEAN NATIONS AND SELECTED YEARS
71
(in thousands)
Year Total West West Fr. Fr. % U.K. U.K. Italy Italy
of 4 Germ. Germ. of the %of %of
%of 4 the 4 the 4
the 4
1974 859 655 76% 23 3% 73 8% 108 13%
1979 486 332 68% 34 7% 46 9% 74 15%
1983 542 277 51% 242 45% 17 3% 6 1%
1987 483 377 78% 48 10% 50 10% 8 2%
1991 180 162 90% I 1% 14 8% 3 2%
Total exports to all countries
1991 115,382 111,931 136% 112,208 141% 11605 11% 11638 12%
Daimler-Benz and BMW could achieve economies of scale by installing
66 FACTS & FIGURES '92, supra note 5, at 45.
67 Id.
68 The drop in 1991 is likely due to the shift of production facilities for export to other countries
outside Europe.
69 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 95.
70 id.
" WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 128, 152, 179, 249, 250.
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the same pollution control equipment on all units of a given class. Thus, if
standards in the EC conformed to those of the chief export markets, the United
States and Japan, these large firms could theoretically increase profits. 72 Thus,
German producers had more of an economic incentive to keep up with the strict
U.S. standards than did the other EC countries.
D. Technological Considerations
The major variables that determine pollutant emissions from vehicles are
the quality of the fuel, engine characteristics, and post-combustion treatment.73 The
subject of this article is automobile and light-truck emissions. These vehicles
generally have Otto-type engines, which burn gasoline, although a minority have
diesel engines.74 Motor vehicle emissions consist of crankcase emissions,
evaporative emissions (from the fuel in the tank), and exhaust emissions.75 This
article concerns exhaust emissions. 76 Factors which determine the amount of
exhaust emissions include: fuel composition, air-fuel ratio, temperature, engine
geometry, and others.77 The amounts of carbon monoxide ("CO") and unburned
hydrocarbons ("HG") are particularly dependent upon the ratio of air and fuel in the
cylinder-if there is an excess of fuel, more carbon will be insufficiently oxidized
and more CO and HCs created.78 Production of nitrogen oxides ("NO.") also
depends greatly on air-fuel ratio along with engine geometry.79
Engine modifications to reduce pollution aim to control tightly the air-fuel
ratio and to refine engine geometry. 0 Such measures include electronic fuel
injection, quick-heating intake manifolds, ignition without spark plugs, and cylinder
head modifications.8' Alternative fuel mixtures can be used to reduce CO. 2
Possible methods to reduce oxides of nitrogen are exhaust gas recirculation,
catalytic reduction, and engine modifications. 3 The most popular method, catalytic
72 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 250.
3 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGY (AIR POLLUTION CONTROL) 765
(Paul N. Cheremisinoff ed., 1989) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGY].
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Although not the focus of this article, significant efforts have been made to reduce other emissions
related to vehicle use. These efforts include controlling emissions from gasoline dispensing facilities.
See, e.g., Bay Area Air Quality Management District (California): Regulation 8, Organic Compounds,
Rule 7, Gasoline Dispensing Facilities, June 1, 1994. For example, in smoggy areas, vapor recovery
systems reduce the escape of fumes during filling of gasoline station tanks from tanker trucks. Id. §
8-7-301.1. Similarly, vapor recovery systems at the pump reduce emissions while transferring fuel
from the station tanks to motor vehicles. Id. § 8-7-302.1.
77 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 73, at 768-73.
78 C.S. R.Ao, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL ENGINEERING 270 (1991).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 271.
82 Id.
" Id. at 273.
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reduction, employs a catalyst system in which NO. is reduced to molecular nitrogen
while HCs and CO are oxidized to carbon dioxide and water simultaneously.8 4
Then air is injected, and the mixture passed over an oxidative catalyst where the
remaining HCs and CO are oxidized."5
In the early 1970s, firms were just creating the catalytic converter
technology, which was the most promising technology to reduce vastly emissions
from Otto engines. In addition, firms were able to achieve significant reductions
through engine modifications and other changes, with varying degrees of success.
These technologies matured in the 1980s and regulations forced catalytic converters
to become standard equipment in the United States and the EC.86 Cars with
catalytic converters require unleaded gasoline, because lead gasoline poisons the
catalyst.8 7
E. Political Situation
Politics, especially the political power of environmentalists, naturally
played a crucial role in the European auto emission control story. There are two
dimensions to this story: relative power among states and domestic politics within
states.
1. Relative State Power and Other Actors at the Europe- Wide Level
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy are the most politically
powerful states in the EU. Germany and France have been the chief proponents of
the Common Market as an economic way to tie countries together in order to
prevent future wars in Continental Europe. Despite British reluctance,
circumstances essentially forced the United Kingdom to join in order to avoid
losing influence over European matters.
Germany sees its loss of some sovereignty and its net payments to the
common EU funds as ways to gain military security and to cement its powerful
economic position within Europe. At times, the United Kingdom has been skeptical
about further integration. The smaller countries that are part of the EU have mixed
motives, including freer access to markets and political security.
Besides state actors, business and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") also operate at the Union level. Prior to 1990, two organizations
represented the car industry in Brussels: the Liaison Committee of the Automobile
Industry of the Countries of the European Communities ("CLCA") and the
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 69-70.
87 See id. at 66.
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Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors ("CCMC"). a8 For
example, in 1984, the CCMC lobbied the Commission against efforts by West
Germany to introduce unilateral emission standards.89
2. Internal Politics
Turning to domestic politics, the more "liberal" mainstream parties in many
countries, such as the Social Democratic parties, often have strong environmental
planks in their platforms.9" The Green Party has been the vanguard of
environmentalism and maintained a philosophy of peace,9 although it has never
been more than a fringe party in any country.92 It reached its height of influence in
the mid-1980s.
West Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark had the strongest
environmental movements during the 1970s and 1980s.93 The Green Party seemed
most vocal in Germany. 94 In contrast, environmentalists did not have nearly the
same level of political power in France, Italy, or the United Kingdom during this
period. 95 Partly because they were not as affected by acid rain and the pollution of
central rivers such as the Rhine, and perhaps because they were poorer, Greece,
Spain, and Portugal had relatively undeveloped environmental movements.96
Regarding the domestic political strength of the automobile industries in
various countries, countries without such firms and without production facilities,
such as Denmark, are probably not influenced by the industry as much as countries
with firms and/or production facilities. Assessing the political strengths of the
automobile manufacturers in the producing countries is beyond the scope of this
paper, but the industries in West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy
have played a substantial role in the emissions control debate.97
The remaining important interest group is labor. In the beginning of the
' Andrew McLaughlin & Grant Jordan, The Rationality of Lobbying in Europe: Why Are Euro-
Groups So Numerous and So Weak? Some Evidence from the Car Industry, in LOBBYING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 122, 125 (Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson eds., 1993).
'9 See id. at 126.
90 See, e.g., FRANK L. WILSON, EUROPEAN POLITICS TODAY: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 222
(1994).
"9 "The Greens are a political party that emerged out of the environmental, feminist, peace, and
antinuclear energy movements of the 1970's." See id. at 220-22.
92 For example, in Germany, the Greens commanded 5.6% of the vote in the 1983 Bundestag elections
and 8.3% in 1987. But in the 1990 elections, the Greens won only about 4% of the vote, insufficient
to win any seats in the Bundestag. (Five percent is required.) See id. at 206, 212-13, 221-22. By
comparison, in Italy, the Greens won between two and three percent of the votes and secured a small
number of members in the Chamber of Deputies. See id. at 308.
93 See David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy 94
(1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with WM & MARY ENvTL L. & POL'Y REV.).
94 Id. at 101.
95 Id. at 94-95.
96 Id. at 94.
" See supra part 11.E.I.
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modem environmental movement, around 1970, European labor unions sided with
manufacturers in opposing environmentalists.98 To take an American example, the
United Automobile Workers opposed fuel efficiency standards due to feared loss
of jobs.99 Later, as environmental concerns became mainstream political issues,
organized labor has incorporated certain pro-environmental positions."°° Due to the
difficulty of obtaining source data, this article does not characterize the positions
of the individual labor unions in the European emission standards debate.
III. ANALYSIS OF EC EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS
STANDARDS
A. Definition of Harmonization; Alternative Approaches to Managing the Conflict
Between Free Trade and Internal Environmental Policies
There are at least three approaches for handling the conflict between free
trade agreements and domestic environmental policies: domestic treatment, mutual
recognition and harmonization.'' At one end of the spectrum is "domestic
treatment," under which governments may apply their own internal standards to
imports. Under this approach, countries may restrict or ban imports that do not
meet domestic standards.0 2 For example, as mentioned below, Germany threatened
to stop imports of French and Italian vehicles that did not meet Germany's emission
standards.0 3 At the other end of the spectrum is "mutual recognition," where
governments are prohibited from applying their own standards to imports; rather,
they must accept products that meet the environmental standards of the exporting
country. In the middle is "harmonization," where governments agree to follow a
common environmental standard.
Upward harmonization occurs when governments raise standards toward
the most stringent environmental standard among them.l"4 Upward harmonization
9' See, e.g., BORGE LORENTZEN ET AL., Industrial Relations and the Environment: Denmark in I
EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: TEN COUNTRIES UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 87, 93 (Andrea Oates
& Denis Gregory eds., 1993).
99 ERIC J. TODER ET AL., TRADE POLICY AND THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY I (1978).
"o LORENTZEN ET AL., supra note 98, at 93.
10t These three may coexist, as they do in the EU. For a discussion of two approaches (bans and
upward harmonization), see Richard H. Steinberg, State Power and Trade-Environment Negotiations:
Lessons from the EU, NAFTA, and GATT/WTO 6 (Berkeley Roundtable on the International
Economy ("BRIE") Working Paper No. 75, Feb. 1995) (on file with author).
102 This approach is the default when there is no international trading regime.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
o Professor Vogel calls the "ratcheting upwards of regulatory standards in competing political
jurisdictions," the "California effect." See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 5-8, 94. He refers to the upward
pressure that California has been able to exert on U.S. auto emissions standards. Id. at 6. The 1967
Clean Air Act Amendments allowed California to have stricter vehicle emission standards than the rest
of the United States, due to the serious pollution in the Los Angeles air basin. California maintained
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does not necessarily mean adopting the standards of the most stringent country. It
may mean adopting a standard which raises the average among nations, but not all
the way to the top.
Downward harmonization occurs when governments drop toward the least
stringent standard among them.' °5 Again, the result is a lower average, not
necessarily equal to the laxest standard among the nations.
B. The Automobile Emissions Case in the European Community
1. Introduction
As in the United States, serious regulation of automobile emissions in
Western Europe began around 1970. In both the United States and Western Europe,
air pollution laws were a response to the nascent environmental movement, which
enjoyed enough political support to achieve its first legislative successes.
Also like the United States, the EC reduced emission standards for new
vehicles rather dramatically over the next twenty years. 6 Appendix Figure A-I
shows a rough time trend of EC standards. While Appendix Figure A-I appears to
suggest great progress in reducing pollution from vehicles, it is only part of the
story. First, these emission standards only apply to new vehicles. While some
developed nations have imposed various inspection and maintenance requirements
on older vehicles, they have not required retrofitting. Therefore, only as the vehicle
fleet turns over and old cars are taken out of service completely do the clean, new
cars substantially lower the average of all vehicle emissions. Second, two trends
result in increases in total emissions (as compared with emissions per vehicle): (1)
the growth in the total number of vehicles, and (2) the increase in miles driven per
vehicle. These trends counteract the smaller emissions per mile of new vehicles.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the first controversy regarding
automobile emissions concerned lead added to gasoline, and it deserves brief
higher standards, and the auto manufacturers reluctantly met them, partly because California is roughly
10% of the domestic market. FACTS & FIGURES '92, supra note 5, at 21 (stating new passenger car
registrations in California in 1990 were 1,003,613 of a U.S. total of 9,103,204, or 11%). In the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress raised the standards for the United States, while allowing other
states to adopt the same higher standards as California. See id. at 259. Subsequently, twelve
northeastern states banded together, initially proposing to adopt California's standards. Id.
"' Murphy describes a dramatic example of movement toward the "least common denominator" in
his discussion of ship flags-of-convenience. See Dale D. Murphy, Open Economies' Competition for
Comparative Regulatory Advantage 21-28 (Nov. 1993) (on file with author).
Professor Vogel calls this the "Delaware effect," referring to state-by-state competition to
achieve the most management-friendly corporation laws. Delaware is the acknowledged winner of this
"race to the bottom." See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 5-6.
106 Appendix Table A-I shows U.S. emission standards for automobiles for the last 20 years(converted from grams per mile to grams per kilometer). Unfortunately, due to the manner of
expression of European standards, it was not possible within the time available for this research to
make a complete year-by-year comparison.
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mention as an introduction to controversies about other pollutants. By the late
1960s, scientific evidence showed that high lead levels in the bloodstream were
associated with adverse neurological effects, especially in children. In the United
States, studies showed the sources of lead to include vehicular emissions and their
fallout (on dirt), lead-paint chips, and others. Inner-city children (especially with
a common childhood syndrome of eating things such as paint and dirt) were highly
exposed to these sources. The U.S. policy response was to phase out lead in both
paint and gasoline.
In Europe in 1972, West Germany instituted stringent lead restrictions for
gasoline, 0.4 grams per liter ("g/l") by 1972 and 0.15 g/I by 1976."° Britain
imposed looser limits of 0.84 g/l.' No other countries regulated lead gasoline at
this time." Because engine modifications were needed to run on reduced-lead and
unleaded gasoline, these fuel changes had implications for the vehicle industry and
trade.
These domestic laws were challenged as a barrier to free trade, of not only
gasoline, but also of vehicles that required lead fuel. Therefore, in 1973, the
Commission suggested to the Council of Ministers a uniform standard for lead
content in gasoline. Germany pushed for a strict standard, and Britain and other
nations also moved toward greater stringency, though not as far as Germany."'
Finally a Directive was adopted, which set both minimum (0.15 g/i) and maximum
(0.4 g/i) standards."' This accommodated Germany's strict 0.15 g/I standards.
Similar dynamics will be seen in the discussion of other pollutants below.
2. Early Actions: Adoption of the UN-ECE Standard in the 1970s
In the 1960s, various European countries established individual vehicle
emission standards. In addition, the United Nations Economic Commission on
Europe ("UN-ECE") drew up rather minimal standards." 2 The EC, however, had
no standards of its own.
The EC's lack of standards fits within its first, rather relaxed phase of
environmental protection." 3 During this initial period, from 1964 to 1973, the EC
107 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 64-65.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
i Id.
12 The membership of the UN-ECE included the EC members, the European Free Trade Association
("EFTA") countries and, despite its name, the United States and Canada.
113 See Daniel P. McGrory, Air Pollution Legislation in the United States and the Community, 15 EUR.
L. REv. 298, 304 (1990). McGrory designates the first phase of EC environmental protection as the
period 1964-1973, when environmental protection was not linked to the establishment and operation
of the Common Market. Id The second phase followed the development of a true environmental
program in 1972. Id. By comparison, the United States passed its first comprehensive regulatory
scheme for air pollution in 1967, and its first strong program in the 1970 Clean Air Act. See id at 299.
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lacked any environmental mandate in its "constitution,""' 4 and it passed only
minimal environmental legislation geared toward reducing barriers to trade." 5
Policymakers realized that consistent pollution laws would eliminate "unfair"
competition between members with minimal or no standards and those members
with such laws." 6
The first EC strategy for harmonization was the adoption of a "borrowed"
standard which was nearly a least common denominator. In the face of internal
disagreement between the "greener" countries and the "less-green" countries, in
1970 the EC adopted the UN-ECE standard for two pollutants: CO and unburned
HCs." 7 This action satisfied the political pressure from the nascent environmental
movement for adopting some Community-wide standards.
The adoption of the relatively low common denominator illustrates several
points. First, when the member states' primary goal was liberalizing trade, free
trade trumped environmental concerns. The EC's chief priority in considering
emission standards was restraining "greener" states from unilaterally imposing
stricter standards that would be a barrier to trade. (In contrast, as the EC's list of
goals expanded to include environmental concerns, for example in the 1987 S.E.A.,
free trade no longer necessarily superseded these concerns.)
Second, domestic politics within each member state played a crucial role
in the adoption of the EC's standard. Of course, domestic politics generally
determine a state's objectives. But the point worth making is that the adoption of
the UN-ECE standards coincided with a nascent and immature environmental
movement. The political power of the mainstream environmentalists (and the
fringe Green Party) had not yet been firmly established. Serious environmental
regulation was a relatively new governmental activity, not widely understood or
accepted. With a poor power base, the environmentalists failed to achieve stricter
standards. Thus, with free trade as the top goal and a milieu of unmobilized
political support, the result was a "least common denominator."
3. The Beginnings of EC Environmental Programmes and Tightening of the Vehicle
Emission Standards
This section briefly summarizes the standards adopted in the 1970s. It then
discusses the politics behind the development of these standards.
Responding to growing political pressure from the environmental
movement, in 1972 the Commission proposed to create a common EC
environmental policy."8 The members agreed, and the policy was promulgated in
114 See infra part II.A. (discussing the EEC Treaty).
"t McGrory, supra note 113, at 304.
116 Id.
"' Council Directive 70/220/EEC of June 15, 1974 Approximation of the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Measures to Be Taken Against Air Pollution by Gases from Positive-tgnition Engines of
Motor Vehicles, 1970 O.J. (L 76).
"' See Vandermeersch, supra note 12, at 409.
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1973.",9 In 1974, following the initiation of the first true environmental program,
the EC reduced the limits for CO and HCs. 2° In 1977, the EC established
restrictions for oxides of nitrogen.1"' Then in 1978, the Commission reduced the
limits for CO, HCs, and NO,.'22
Turning to the politics behind these decisions, during the late 1970s and the
1980s, the countries with strong environmental movements-West Germany, the
Netherlands, and Denmark-supported the stricter standards. 2 3 Those with weak
environmental movements-France, Italy, and the United Kingdom-opposed
them. 24
Second, the manufacturers of large, expensive cars, namely Daimler-Benz,
BMW, and Audi, in Germany, and the small British and French manufacturers,
favored the move to catalytic converters. 2' These manufacturers exported luxury
cars to the United States and Japan and had already installed catalytic converters for
those markets. Adoption of these standards for the EC would reduce these firms'
costs by dropping the separate production lines for dirtier cars. 26 In other words,
using Murphy's terminology, these firms had high multinational asset specificity;
therefore, they supported uniform standards in their target markets.'27
In contrast, countries producing small cars, namely France and Italy (with
Renault, Peugeot, and Fiat), opposed the standards primarily because of the
additional cost of catalytic conversion. Because buyers of smaller cars have greater
elasticity of demand (i.e., are more sensitive to price increases), these producers
worried that small cars sales would drop.
Britain, with no major domestic firms but foreign-owned plants which
produced medium-sized cars, sided with the small car producers.' 2 The British
favored a "lean-bum" engine instead of the end-of-pipe catalytic converter.'29 This
"' First Programme of Action on the Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112).
120 Council Directive 74/290/EEC of 28 May 1974 Adapting to Technical Progress Council Directive
No. 70/220/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Measures to Be
Taken Against Air Pollution by Gases from Positive-Ignition Engines of Motor Vehicles, 1974 O.J.
(L 159) 61. The limits are expressed in terms of mass of pollutant per test in grams, according to
vehicle reference weight. Council Directive 74/290/EEC, Annex, 1974 O.J. (L 159) 61, 63. As such,
these standards are difficult to compare to standards expressed in typical U.S. terms, such as grams per
kilometer ("g/km").
21 Commission Directive 77/102/EEC, 1976 O.1. (L 32) 32.
122 Commission Directive 78/665/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 223) 48. Again, these limits are expressed in
terms of mass of pollutant per test in grams, according to vehicle reference weight. Id. at 51. See
supra note 120.
123 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 67.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 68.
126 See id. at 68-69. Professor Vogel notes two other factors contributing to this support: the
availability of unleaded gas, and German tax incentives for purchasing lower-emissions cars. Id. at
69.
127 See Murphy, supra note 105, at 7-8.
128 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 69.
129 See id.
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stance may be attributed to Ford U.K.'s inexperience with catalytic converter
technology and its investment in "lean-bum" research. 3°Due to these divergent views, the approach taken by Directive 70/220/EEC
(and subsequent directives until at least 83/351/EEC in 1983) was "permissive" or
"optional," rather than mandatory. 3' The EC used a compromise strategy which
did not require the "dirtier" countries to come all the way up to West Germany's
standards. This strategy was "optional harmonization,"'' 32 meaning that members
were not obligated to adopt EC standards as their own national standards, but they
could not refuse national or European Economic Community ("EEC") "type
approval" of a vehicle if it met the EC directive.'33
Thus, the directives formed a "ceiling," or maximum stringency, not a
"floor," or minimum stringency. Despite the weakness of the floor concept, there
was some environmental improvement, since producers who wished to export
within the EC had to meet the EC standard.
This ceiling approach was a compromise that forced the "greener"
countries, such as West Germany, to accept dirtier cars from France and Italy as
long as they met the EC standard. At the same time, it forced French and Italian
firms to come up to the EC standard. The advantage of this strategy was that
"greener" countries could maintain their own higher standards if they wanted,
thereby satisfying their own domestic environmental constituencies.
4. Movement Toward US. Standards in the Early 1980s
In the early 1980s, technical advances made lower emissions possible, and
the EC implemented stricter limits. 134 In 1983, the EC reduced the limits for CO,
HCs, and NO..'35 However, in order to preserve the common market, the EC
continued the "optional harmonization" policy, preventing members from banning
vehicles not meeting even stricter domestic standards.
36
130 See id.
13' This approach contrasts with the 1970 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments which established
ambitious goals and uniform national standards (with the exception of California). In other words, in
the United States, all states (except California) had to meet the same target; no variation was allowed.
Furthermore, California did not have to accept cars meeting the federal standards. California could
keep out cars which did not meet its higher standards. In contrast, Germany could not keep out French
and Italian cars that fell below German standards but met EC standards.
'
2 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIRECTIVES
IN THE TWELVE MEMBER STATES 161 (Graham Bennett ed., 1991) [hereinafter AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE EC].
' See, e.g., Council Directive 74/290/EEC, art. 2, 1974 O.J. (L 159) 61, 62. See also AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE EC, supra note 132, at 161 (explaining that "type approval" shows that a vehicle type
conforms with certain standards of design and construction).
'14 Most of the Directives contain language assigning the reason for the reduced limits to technical
advances.
"' Council Directive 83/351/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 197) 1.
136 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 57.
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Then in 1984, the Commission broke with the past by proposing further
reductions in these three pollutants by seventy percent and the elimination of lead
from gasoline.' These requirements went hand in hand because the emission
reductions were based on catalytic converters which required unleaded gas. This
proposal matched the U.S. standards of 1983 (commonly referred to as "US '83")3'
but was not successful at the Council level. 39
5. The Luxembourg Compromise: 1985-1987
Faced with continuing disagreement between the "northern" and "southern"
factions regarding catalytic conversion, as described above, the Commission then
fashioned a compromise that proposed stricter standards for large cars and
somewhat stricter standards for small cars. This compromise satisfied the German
firms that exported luxury cars to the United States in that luxury cars from
elsewhere in Europe would face the same regulation. The compromise satisfied
southern European manufacturers of small cars which felt that the relative price
increase of catalytic converters, if required for small cars, would significantly
reduce demand. Finally, it satisfied those supporting stricter standards in the sense
that some progress was made.
The key economic factor of this agreement was the relative price increase.
All members supported the American standards for big European-made cars
because many large cars already had fuel injection and the increased cost for the
converter alone was relatively small. 4 ' The dispute centered on small and medium-
sized cars, which would bear a large absolute increase due to fuel injection and a
larger proportional increase in terms of total cost.' 4'
The turning point in the debate was Germany's threat to unilaterally impose
its own emission standards.'42 This would have prevented entry of French and
Italian cars into Germany. Accompanying the threat of market closure, the political
threat (perhaps implied) was that Germany would stall further integration.
At this point in the case history, a digression regarding state power is
necessary. As discussed in Part II, West Germany in the 1980s (and unified
Germany today) was the most economically and politically powerful member of the
/
/
'17 See id. at 66.
"8 Several members of EFTA had already adopted standards patterned after the ones adopted by the
United States. Id.
" In addition, because meeting the U.S. standards would require three-way catalysts and electronic
fuel injection, the European debate turned to the acceptability of these technical requirements. See
VOGEL, supra note 14, at 67.
140 See id. at 68.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 70.
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EC (and EU today). Steinberg demonstrates that powerful countries desiring
upward harmonization attempt to coerce and/or compensate resistant countries into
agreeing to upward harmonization.'" Powerful states may coerce such countries
by threatening to close their domestic markets to imports 45 or compensate them by
opening up their own domestic markets to imports from the resistant states.'"4 Thus,
depending upon (1) the power of the demandeur rich-green countries, (2) the extent
of their interest in such demands, and (3) the existence of means by which
demandeur states may coerce or compensate through the mechanisms of a trade
regime, powerful states may achieve upward harmonization.
Thus, Germany used its power to coerce and compensate the southern
European countries into upward movement. The threat to close its borders to
French and Italian cars was one example of such coercion.
Germany's threat to impose unilateral standards, however, was not carried
out. German manufacturers, fearing initiation of a trade-war, urged their
government to retreat. 47 Ultimately, Germany passed legislation requiring catalytic
converters but delayed implementation until 1988 for autos with engines larger than
2.0 liters and until 1989 for all other cars.
The Council compromised by allowing medium-sized cars to use "lean-
bum" engines or comparable measures and by adopting laxer standards for smaller
vehicles. 48 The net result for Germany was laxer standards for autos made outside
Germany (since under EC rules, Germany could not block their entry) but stricter
standards for its own producers.
The final "Luxembourg Compromise" adopted different standards for large
capacity (greater than 2.0 liters), medium capacity (1.4 to 2.0 liters), and small (less
than 1.4 liters) cars. 49 Again, the Directive set a ceiling, not a floor ("optional
harmonization"). The result was less stringent than the U.S. '83 standards, although
the EC claimed it was just as stringent. 5 '
In essence, the small car manufacturers had evaded the strict standards in
the short-term, although they faced a provision requiring the EC to adopt stricter
standards for small and medium-sized cars in 1987, to be effective in 1992 and
1993. Despite this apparent victory, the compromise was scuttled when Denmark,
an advocate of stricter standards, vetoed the compromise.' 5 ' From 1985 to 1987,
no rule was passed.
43 Steinberg defines "power" in economic terms as the "magnitude of an offer of compensation in the
form of improved market access and the magnitude of a threat to close a market." See Steinberg, supra
note 101, at 13.
144 See id.
145 Id. at 2.
146 These market openings are quasi-Coasian solutions. See id. at 2, 10-12. Here the victim pays.
147 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 70.
14 Id.
141 Council Directive 88/76/EEC, Annex, 1988 O.J. (L 36) I, 4-5.
1S0 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 115.
'51 See id. at 72.
[Vol. 20:175200
HARMONIZATION OF AUTOMOBILE EMISSION STANDARDS
After the 1987 S.E.A., the "Luxembourg Compromise" finally became
law.' With the S.E.A., just a qualified majority, rather than a consensus, was
required for Council approval. Thus, Denmark's veto was overridden. After
approval by the European Parliament (which by then had approval power), the
compromise became law in November 1987.'"
6. The Late 1980s-Upward Harmonization
By the late 1980s, several factors combined to promote upward
harmonization. Stronger environmental movements emerged in several countries,
including Britain.'54 The momentum toward greater economic integration in 1992
spurred more pressure for true harmonization. Finally, both Renault and Fiat were
building cars with three-way catalysts for sale in the Netherlands.'
In February 1988, the Commission proposed a compromise that would
equate the standards for small and medium-sized cars, but at less stringent standards
for both.'56 The Council tentatively approved this compromise in June 1988, with
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece in opposition. 7
Vigorous environmentalist lobbying in the European Parliament, just prior
to an election, spurred a more stringent proposal.' In addition, the Netherlands
unilaterally decided to require catalytic converters for all vehicles sold within its
borders.' The result was a second and much stricter version of the Small Car
Directive. 60 In July 1989, the members approved this directive by a qualified
majority, opposed by Denmark and Greece. 6' The limits were stricter than even
the 1987 large car limits.
7. The Early 1990s--Current Trends in European Regulation
In 1990, Denmark enacted emission standards stricter than those of the
Community, based on the S.E.A.'s allowance for environmental laws stricter than
Community standards if necessary to improve environmental quality.'62 This
enactment raised the specter of internal barriers to trade. The Commission decided
not to challenge Denmark in the European Court of Justice because the Council was
152 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1-28.
153 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 73.
154 Id.
"I As explained below, the Netherlands required such converters, although in violation of EC law.
Member countries did not choose to take the Netherlands to the European Court of Justice over this
violation.
156 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 74.
151 See id.
158 Id.
59 Id. at 75.
161 Council Directive 89/458/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 226) 1.
161 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 76.
162 S.E.A. Article IOA, para. 4.
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about to raise emissions standards comparably anyway."' Further directives in
1991 and 1993 tightened standards even more."'
8. Results
As a result, according to Jean-Pierre Reynier, Secretary General of the
European Automobile Manufacturers Association, a new European car today emits
93% less CO and 85% less hydrocarbons-plus-NO, than an equivalent vehicle in
1970.165 As shown in Appendix Figure A-I, the EC reduced CO and HCs by 50%
by 1975, and by about 90% by July 1992, based on the dates of enforcement of EC
directives. The EC began to regulate NO. in 1977, resulting in emission reductions
of about 75% by July 1992.66 Of course, these figures concern only the vehicle
emissions per mile, whereas growth in the number of vehicles and the number of
miles traveled per vehicle continues to offset reduced emissions per mile.167
On the other hand, lead has been eliminated from most Western European
gasoline. This elimination is a significant air quality improvement.
Because West Germany and the Netherlands never carried out their mid-
1980s threats to erect barriers to non-conforming vehicles, the EC managed to stave
off such barriers through the 1980s. On the other hand, in the 1990s, higher
national standards are being tolerated (e.g., Denmark). Thus, the final result in
Europe (under S.E.A. Article 100A) allows members to maintain stricter national
environmental standards despite possible barriers to trade.
C. Summary of Approaches the EC Took to Achieve Upward Harmonization
1. Upward Harmonization by Compromise Through Product Differentiation
A method for partial, but upward, harmonization in Europe was attained
through differentiation of emission standards by product class. In the 1985
Luxembourg Compromise, different standards were adopted for different size cars.
163 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 77.
'64 See id.
165 Drive for the Clean, Lean Car, supra note I. Although the source indicates a 93% reduction in
CO2, this must be a typographical error. Carbon monoxide, not carbon dioxide, has been reduced.
166 Id.
167 According to one source, this has left total emissions from automobiles "virtually unchanged." See
id. (stating that emission reductions achieved through increasing fuel efficiency, removing lead from
gasoline, and using catalytic converters, have been counteracted by increasing numbers of vehicles and
longer average journeys, leaving pollution levels "virtually unchanged"). Nevertheless, there were air
quality improvements in Europe from control of stationary air pollution sources.
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2. Upward Harmonization Through Threats from the Largest Market and the
Dominant Political Player
Due to the political and economic strength of the leader, West Germany,
even compromises resulted in steady upward harmonization. Were the political and
economic leader not inclined toward stricter standards, such a result would have
been unlikely. 6
We may infer that the key characteristic allowing successful threats by
dominant market participants is the existence of one or more players with a market
large enough to make a ban a very serious threat to the profitability of exporters in
other countries.
3. Upward Harmonization Through Federalization/Centralization
It was not until the S.E.A. and qualified majority voting that the EC could
attain upward harmonization where there was serious dispute. In contrast, in the
United States, a highly-developed federal system, the central federal government
has extensive control over commerce; the states' power over commerce is severely
curtailed; and harmonization is easier to accomplish.'69 Having a weak federal
government, the EC members struggled against each other, with slower results.
As the EC, now the EU, advanced toward greater integration, the federal
characteristics grew stronger. Consequently, the Council and Commission grew in
their ability to enact more stringent directives and to allow maverick states with
serious environmental concerns to push forward. This is similar to the United
States allowing states with severe air quality problems, such as California, to have
stricter standards. 170
One of the important elements of centralized policymaking is the
international institutions, if any, through which policymaking takes place. The
structure and authority of the international institutions in Europe facilitated the
upward harmonization which took place with increasing integration. 7' As the EC
institutions gained authority, the Commission grew bold enough to make its 1984
proposals, radical departures from prior policy.
168 See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 96.
69 Even though the U.S. system has made harmonization easier, the leading force behind increased
stringency has been California. Because of its unusual climate which exacerbates ozone formation,
California adopted motor vehicle regulations in the 1950s, long before similar federal regulations.
California has led efforts to decrease emissions since that time. See, e.g., Haig Simonian, Smog Clears
over Carmakers, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at 9 (discussing California's leadership in reducing vehicle
emissions).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (1988) (allowing waiver of prohibition against state standards, as long as
the EPA Administrator finds the state standards to be at least as protective of public health and welfare
as the federal standards).
i'~ See VOGEL, supra note 14, at 251-52.
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D. Summary of Factors Determining the Approach and Direction of Harmoniz-
ation, IfAny
From this analysis, the critical factors influencing the direction of
harmonization are large consumer states, supplier preferences, state power,
domestic political support, and the structure of the international regime and its
institutions.
1. Market Structure: Large Consumer Markets
As explained above, the threat of keeping foreign cars out of Europe's
largest market, Germany, was formidable. Therefore, one or more large consumer
states can influence the direction of harmonization.
2. Supplier Preferences
Supplier preferences may sound like an economic oxymoron (because one
usually speaks of suppliers meeting consumer preferences), but this phrase refers
to preferences stemming from market opportunities. As described above, German
manufacturers exported to "greener" markets and preferred uniform standards
within Europe. Uniform standards would: (1) promote economy-of-scale gains for
German suppliers, and (2) apply to all suppliers, thereby "leveling the playing
field." Thus, the most powerful reasons for manufacturers to support upward
harmonization are: (1) potential cost reductions and increased profits, and (2)
eliminating the advantages of lower-cost competitors.
3. State Power
While the EC/EU has no single dominant member, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom have played pivotal roles. As the leading economic power in
Europe, Germany had substantial influence over integration policy. With this
power, Germany had leverage. Nevertheless, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Denmark had difficulty moving the EC towards more stringent emission controls.'
4. Political Support
Of course, one of the most important factors in implementing more
stringent product standards is environmentalists' political power and the acceptance
of environmental goals by mainstream political parties.
72 While an explanation of the complex linkages involved in EC decisionmaking in the 1970s and
1980s are beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the greater the number of parties and the
greater the number needed to make a decision, the more difficult is harmonization.
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5. Coincidence of Political Support and Supplier Preference
West Germany happened to have both strong political support for emission
controls and powerful export-oriented firms which desired uniform standards. The
congruence of these two factors produced a leader espousing upward
harmonization.
6. Institutional Structure and Decisionmaking Rules
As the integration of Western Europe increased, so did the call and need for
harmonization. Although never a federal system, under which harmonization is
relatively easy, the EC adopted more stringent regulations when its central
institutions grew stronger and when qualified voting replaced consensus voting.
E. Conclusions
Exploration of a single case study does not necessarily reveal a
comprehensive analysis of circumstances that may influence harmonization trends
upward or downward. But this case reveals a number of important factors that are
likely to influence harmonization in a given economic sector:' 73
" Existence of large consumer markets
* Leadership and preferences of largest producers
" Political power of the "greener" countries
" Internal political support
• Coincidence of all of the above
* Institutional structure and rules of the trading regime.
Furthermore, this analysis is useful for examining vehicle emission
standards under other trade regimes. Predictions for harmonization under the WTO
and NAFTA follow.
IV. APPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE HARMONIZATION UNDER THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
A. Legal, Economic, and Political Framework for Automobile Exhaust Emissions
Regulation Under the World Trade Organization
1. Legal Framework: Instruments
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") expired in
3 Research on different sectors may lead to more general results.
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1994 and was replaced by the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). Nevertheless, the WTO included a "reinvigoration" of
GATT as "GATT 1994."' 74 Thus, many of the provisions of GATT 1947 are in
force under the WTO.
The first important WTO/GATT rules for this analysis are "national
treatment" and its exceptions. Under the 1947 GATT, the Contracting Parties
("CPs") agreed that "internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations
and requirements affecting the internal sale, ... or use of products, . . . should not
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production." ' Further, the CPs agreed that imports from another CP "shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements.' 76 In other words,
domestic environmental regulations cannot be applied to ban imports in order to
protect domestic industry.
But GATT provides general exceptions to national treatment and other
GATT requirements for certain health and safety and environmental measures.
GATT Article XX(b) allows a general exception for measures "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health," subject to such measures not constituting
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries. This provision suggests
that automobile emission standards set forth to protect air quality could fall under
the Article XX(b) exception to national treatment. GATT Article XX(g) provides
an exception for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption." This provision could provide an exception
for automobile fuel efficiency standards.
The second important WTO/GATT characteristic is the dispute resolution
mechanism, which is a dramatic departure from GATT 1947. Under GATT 1947,
if an exporting country believed that an importing country (assuming both were
CPs) were using an internal regulation as a barrier to trade, it brought forward an
allegation. The CPs then formed a "GATT Panel" to hear the issue. The GATT
panel "issued" a decision, which had to be "adopted" by the CPs by unanimous
consensus. The consensus requirement was a significant barrier to enforcement
because the violator could veto adoption of the Panel report.
Under the WTO, the decision rule is reversed. A complaining party, similar
to a plaintiff, still brings an allegation, and a Panel is formed. Rather than have the
'7 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [WTO Agreement] art. 2, para. 4 provides:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in Annex IA
(hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
'" GATT art. III, para. 1.
76 d para. 4.
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adoption of the panel report depend upon consensus of the parties,'77 however, the
report must be rejected by consensus, or else it is approved.78 In other words, a
WTO panel decision can only be "overruled" by unanimous consensus. Suppose
that a Panel report found a defendant party's domestic vehicle emission standard
to be a barrier to trade and not a valid exception. Under the old GATT, the
defendant could veto the report. Under the WTO, the defendant cannot veto it.
2. Market Structure
For practical purposes, the market structure relevant to the WTO is the
world market structure described in Part II.B. All of the major producing countries
are members of the WTO. The major consuming countries are also represented,
with the exception of China. The largest consuming nations are the United States
and the western European nations.'79
3. Political Situation
In comparison to the EU, the WTO is a loose trade agreement, lacking the
structure of political and economic integration present in the EU. On the other
hand, the WTO is a tighter agreement than the GATT 1947 because it has a larger
and more powerful central organization and a more powerful dispute resolution
mechanism.
B. The Improbability of Harmonization ofAutomobile Emission Standards Under
the World Trade Organization
1. Supplier Preferences, Consumer Markets, and Political Support
Supplier preferences in terms of the WTO encompass essentially all
producers. Producers in large countries currently in the EU or NAFTA already are
standardizing upward in order to meet the converging high standards of the United
States and the EU. To the extent that the largest markets for these producers
... WTO Agreement art. 9, para. I provides: "The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-
making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. " (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (omitted
footnote defines "consensus": "The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus
on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision
is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.").
178 WTO Agreement Annex 2, art. 16, para. 4, provides:
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the
report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report....
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
" See supra part lI.B.
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demand low-emission vehicles, the producers will have the incentive to promote
upward harmonization in order to achieve economies of scale in design and
manufacture. Thus, as the U.S. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments ("CAAA") put
greater demands on manufacturers,' this incentive is likely to lead to upward
pressure.
On the other hand, the emerging markets are primarily in Asian countries,
such as China, Thailand, and South Korea.' Although pressures for environmental
improvement in these countries undoubtedly exist, these pressures are in an
immature state. With the exception of South Korea, these countries also do not
have large producers attempting to export to the West. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that automobile producers in these developing countries will generate either the
high domestic demand for low-emission vehicles or the domestic political support
for stringent standards.8 2
Furthermore, political support and supplier preferences do not coincide
because the political support is generally strongest in industrialized countries, but
the suppliers in industrialized countries may not have the economic incentive to
support higher standards in developing markets because these markets are small.
In developing markets, the production of vehicles with fewer emission
controls ("dirtier vehicles") may provide efficiency when the factories that produce
these vehicles are located in these countries and only produce vehicles for local
markets. Without an extensive microeconomic analysis beyond the scope of this
paper, a definitive conclusion is not possible. It seems unlikely, however, that
world-class manufacturers will push for upward harmonization in developing Asian
markets.
2. Political Power Structure
Although some argue that the WTO has no single dominant member or
group, the Group of 7 ("G7")..3 appears to exercise strong influence. Nevertheless,
the numerous parties and emerging trading blocs, such as the recent Asian trading
agreement, mean that power is diffuse. This diffusion of power goes hand in hand
with the relatively weak nature of GATT 1947.1 4 Only time will tell how much
stronger the WTO turns out to be. Based on these observations, it is unlikely the
"0 The 1990 CAAA imposes stricter new vehicle emission standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994).
It also requires states with certain types of ozone and carbon monoxide nonattainment areas to revise
their implementation plans to establish clean-fuel vehicle programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7581-7590
(1994).
181 See supra part II.B.1.
812 This refers to locally-owned domestic developing country producers, such as Maruti Udyog and
Hindustan Motors of India-not foreign-owned plants, such as Ford, Mercedes-Benz, or Honda's
assembly plants in Indonesia. See WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 45, 48.
"3 The Group of Seven consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, and Canada.
184 See supra part IV.A.
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WTO will provide the forum for strong upward harmonization.
3. Institutional Structure and Decisionmaking Rules
Because the WTO is a much weaker organization than the EU, it seems
unlikely that the WTO structures will be the catalysts for upward harmonization.
On the contrary, the WTO could be a mechanism for downward harmonization in
that strict domestic standards may fall when attacked.
Because the WTO Dispute Panel rules, unlike GATT 1947, are stacked in
favor of the complainant rather than the party that allegedly violated the rules, if
a member violates a norm by having stricter standards, the member is likely to
lose.'85 Therefore, bans of vehicles which do not meet strict domestic emission
standards are more susceptible to successful challenges by the countries producing
less-controlled vehicles than was the case in the EU.
The realities of the vehicle market, however, will probably cancel out this
tendency. The large manufacturers from the major OECD countries already design
and build vehicles which meet the strict standards of the United States, the EU,
and/or Japan. These manufacturers have assembly facilities in developing
countries, but much of their output is destined for the highly regulated markets.
Such firms may produce less-controlled vehicles for the low-stringency developing
country markets,'86 but they are unlikely to attempt to produce "dirty cars" in these
countries and export them back to their home markets which have stringent air
pollution standards. Such an attempt would harm their corporate images.
On the other hand, major manufacturers may have the incentive to equalize
any differences in standards. For example, the EU attacked three U.S. vehicle-
related regulations in 1994: the luxury car tax, the gas-guzzler tax, and the
corporate fuel efficiency standards. In this case, the GATT panel found that the
U.S. laws were an allowable exception. Nevertheless, the potential exists for future
attacks against the standards of the most stringent country, if significantly above
other OECD standards.
87
This potential problem leaves in question manufacturers based in
developing countries like India. In general, these firms do not export to the OECD
at this time but rather serve domestic markets.'88 Unless these countries and firms
attempt an industrialization strategy based upon vehicle exports, they are unlikely
' See supra part IV.A.1.
86 Telephone Interview with Paul Hughes, Manager, Alternative Fuels Section, California Air
Resources Board (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Hughes Interview].
187 Of course, "home country" is a loose term. In this era of globalization, the "home" of a
multinational corporation could be where it is incorporated or where its major assets are located.
Despite these difficulties, most major firms in the automobile industry are identified with a single
home. For instance, General Motors is identified with the United States, and Volkswagen with
Germany.
.88 For example, from the available data, it appears that India has no exports, and China has extremely
small numbers of exports. See WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 42, 44-47.
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to try to penetrate the saturated markets of the OECD.
The possible exception to this conclusion is South Korea. Hyundai,
Daewoo, and Kia are strong and growing manufacturers. South Korea had
substantial exports to North America and the EU in 1992,189 but the Koreans have
already met stringent standards in order to export to the industrialized countries.
4. Conclusions
The WTO is likely to be relatively useless for upward harmonization of
motor vehicle emission standards. On the contrary, the WTO may provide a forum
for striking down maverick countries with the most stringent requirements. Large
manufacturers from industrialized countries will most likely sponsor such attacks,
although the actual production may take place in developing countries.
Manufacturers in developing countries do not seem ready to launch major
challenges of this type themselves.
V. APPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE HARMONIZATION UNDER NAFTA
A. Legal, Economic, and Political Framework for Automobile Exhaust Emissions
Regulation in North America
1. Legal Framework.- Instruments of North American Economic Cooperation
a. The Auto Pact and the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United
States
In 1987, the United States and Canada reached an agreement on the
framework of a free trade area.' 90 Their Free-Trade Agreement came into force in
1988, eliminating tariffs in many areas under specified conditions.' 9 ' This
agreement contained a chapter devoted to automobiles.' 92
Prior to this agreement, the United States and Canada negotiated the
Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, commonly referred to as the Auto
Pact, which entered into force in 1966.'9' The Free-Trade Agreement reaffirmed
the parties' commitment to the Auto Pact but made some changes. Under the Auto
Pact, participating manufacturers and their suppliers could import vehicles and parts
into Canada duty-free from anywhere in the world, as long as they met Auto Pact
189 Id. at 82.
'" See generally TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Marc
Gold & David Leyton-Brown eds., 1988) (discussing the implications of the agreement).
'g' Canada-U.S.: Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
92 See Paul Wonnacott, Autos and the Free Trade Agreement: Toward a More Secure Trading
Relationship, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 190, at 269 (discussing chapter 10 of the
Free-Trade Agreement).
' See id. at 271 (discussing the Auto Pact).
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requirements concerning the production-to-sales ratio in Canada and the local
value-added.194
Under the Free-Trade Agreement, new vehicles and original equipment
parts can cross the border without tariff if they satisfy a rule of origin, which
requires that the imported parts manufacturer incur fifty percent of the direct
production costs in Canada or the United States.'95 The big three North American
manufacturers and their suppliers, who are members of the Auto Pact, qualify to
import vehicles and parts into Canada duty-free as described above.' Other
manufacturers, however, who cannot be part of the Auto Pact, do not receive this
benefit.'97
For the purposes of this analysis, the bottom line is that the United States
and Canada have essentially harmonized their automobile trade already. Therefore,
NAFTA has little incremental effect on these two trading partners in the automobile
sector.
b. The North American Free Trade Agreement and the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation US. -Canada-Mexico 1993
NAFTA lies somewhere between the level of integration of the EU and the
WTO. While the WTO, likeGATT, remains primarily a restraint on barriers to
trade, NAFTA envisions some harmonization but does not go nearly as far as the
EU in its vision of economic and political integration.
NAFTA came into force on January i, 1994, and sets up a framework for
gradual tariff elimination between the United Mexican States ("Mexico"), the
United States, and Canada.' 98 It adopts the "national treatment" concept of Article
III of GATT, including the interpretive notes.'9 9 NAFTA also bans quantitative
restrictions, such as quotas, except for such restrictions that may be allowed by
Article XI of GATT.200
NAFTA does not follow GATT's general exceptions, such as Article
XX(b).201 Instead, NAFTA explicitly lays out rules regarding a number of sectors,
including automobiles. In addition, due to the immense controversy surrounding
NAFTA, particularly arguments by U.S. environmental groups and labor unions,
the parties made side agreements on environmental and labor issues.
Regarding automobiles, NAFTA specifically applies the principle of
194 TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 190, at 265-66.
195 Id. at 265.
'9 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
'9 TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 190, at 265-66.
'9 North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] 1993, art. 302, para 1; Annex 302.2, para. I.
'99 Id. art. 301, para. 1. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the "national treatment" concept of Article
II of GATT).
20 See NAFTA, art. 309, para. I.
201 See supra part IV.A.1.
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national treatment.2 °2 Prior agreements between the United States and Canada,
however, are not overridden.2 3 Furthermore, Mexico may maintain its 1989 Decree
for Development and Modernization of the Automotive Industry2' and
implementing regulations 2°5 until 2004.2' Among other provisions, the Decree and
its regulations allow the government to restrict the number of motor vehicles that
a manufacturer may import into Mexico in relation to the total number of motor
vehicles that the manufacturer sells in Mexico.207 Therefore, NAFTA does not truly
implement the free trade of automobiles between Mexico and the other two parties.
Turning to environmental policy, the preamble of NAFTA sets forth the
goals of promoting sustainable development and strengthening the development and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.2 8  The important
environmental guidelines are in the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation U.S.-Canada-Mexico 1993.209 Under this agreement, the parties
established a Commission for Environmental Cooperation,2"' to be governed by a
Council of cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the parties.21" The Council
is to "promote and facilitate cooperation between the Parties with respect to
environmental matters. '212
As part of this mandate, the Council is to initiate a process of
harmonization "[w]ithout reducing levels of environmental protection, [by]
establishing a process for developing recommendations on greater compatibility of
environmental technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment
procedures in a manner consistent with the NAFTA. 21 3 Despite this high sounding
language, the Environmental Cooperation Agreement does not actually require
harmonization, although Article 10, paragraph 3(b), indicates that any
harmonization shall not be "downward."
Although Mexico had stringent laws on its books, one of the major
contentions of environmental critics with regard to NAFTA was that these laws
202 See id. Annex 300-A, para. I (Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector): "I. Each Party
shall accord to all existing producers of vehicles in its territory treatment no less favorable than it
accords to any new producer of vehicles in its territory under the measures referred to in this Annex.
203 See NAFTA, Appendix 300-A. I.
24 Decreto para el Fomento y Modernizac'ion de la Industria Automotriz [Decree for Development
and Modernization of the Automotive Industry] Dec. II, 1989.
205 Acuerdo que Determina Reglas para la Aplicacio'n del Decreto para el Fomento y Modernizac'ion
de la Industria Automotriz [Resolution that Establishes Rules for the Implementation of the Auto
Decree] Nov. 30, 1990.
21 See NAFTA, Appendix 300-A.2.
20. Id. Annex 300-A, para. 17.
20 Id. preamble.
209 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation U.S.-Canada-Mexico 1993, Sept. 13,
1993, [Environmental Cooperation Agreement].
210 Id. art. 8, para. I.
211 Id. art. 9, para. 1.
212 Id. art. 10, para. 1(0.
213 Id. para. 3(b).
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were not enforced.214 In response, the parties agreed that the Council "shall
encourage ... effective enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws and
regulations." ''1 In order to bolster its image as an enforcer under the agreement,
Mexico increased the number of environmental inspectors from 12 to 500.216
During 1994, Mexico inspected 46,000 plants and shut down about 500.217
Nevertheless, if there is upward harmonization under NAFTA, the ultimate question
is whether Mexico will effectively enforce its laws. This question remains
unanswered in light of Mexico's 1994-1995 difficult economic situation and the
cost of increased environmental protection.
2. Market Structure
As we have seen, there are several prominent European manufacturers
which dominate markets in the EU member states and have substantial exports. But
as a group, they are third largest in sales volume, after the American and Japanese
manufacturers.
In comparison, North America is dominated by manufacturers from a single
nation, the United States. Additionally, there is a strong presence from Japanese
manufacturers operating production facilities (alone or jointly with U.S. firms) in
the United States and Mexico.
In the United States, the "big three" producers are General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler. Annual production has been in the range of five to seven million
from 1989 to 1992."8 In 1991, production by firm was: GM, 2.5 million; Ford, 1.2
million; Chrysler, 0.5 million; Honda, 0.45 million; Toyota, 0.3 million; and lesser
amounts for Mazda, Nissan, and others.1 9
In Canada, the largest producers are Ford and GM.220 There are smaller
presences by Honda, Chrysler, Toyota, Hyundai, and others.22" ' Canada produces
about one million cars annually.
222
In Mexico, annual production of passenger cars has grown roughly from
300,000 in 1980 to 800,000 in 1992.223 In 1992, fifty-five percent were for the
domestic market and forty-five percent were for export.224 Almost all exports went
214 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 101, at 26.
215 Environmental Cooperation Agreement, art. 10, para. 4(a).
26 Richard H. Steinberg, Lecture, International Trade Seminar, University of California at Berkeley,
School of Law (Boalt Hall) (Apr. 20, 1995).
217 Id.
218 WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 329.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 307.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 307-08. (Exports to the United States must accidentally include Canadian consumption in
this data source.)
223 Id. at 314-15.
224 Id.
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to the United States and Canada in 1991 and 1992.223
The Mexican manufacturers, in descending order for 1992 production, are
Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen, GM, and Nissan.226 While there are domestic
producers of trucks and buses, such as Diesel Nacional and Mexicana DeAutobuses,
these firms do not produce passenger cars.227
3. Political Situation
In contrast to the EU, there is no political integration goal under NAFTA.
Although economic interests have played a significant role, Western Europe's
primary agenda in creating the EC (and later the EU) was to create collective self-
interest to ensure peace. 28 NAFTA's purpose is increased trade and economic
growth, not a federation of North American (or American) states.229
B. Potential Harmonization ofAuto Emission Standards Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement
The NAFTA case is far simpler analytically than either the EU or WTO
cases because only three countries are involved and two of these, the United States
and Canada, already have stringent standards. Mexico has no independent domestic
automobile producers. While there has been talk of expanding NAFTA to include
various Central and South American countries, it is beyond the scope of this article
to hypothesize about the future structure of NAFTA. The question boils down to
how standards may increase in stringency in the United States and Canada, and
what standards will be adopted and enforced in Mexico. NAFTA may play a role
as a conduit for the United States, Canada, and various interest groups to exert
pressure on Mexico.
1. Supplier Preferences, Consumer Markets, and Political Support
Supplier preferences in terms- of NAFTA are essentially those of the "big
three" U.S. producers, with minor roles by Japanese firms that have sited
production facilities in North America. There are no independent automobile
producers in Mexico. Because both U.S. and Japanese firms in Mexico already
face stringent requirements for export to the United States and Canada, the issue is
whether separate designs and production lines for the Mexican, Central American,
and South American markets (and other lax standard countries) make economic
225 Id. at 319.
226 Id. at 315.
227 Id.
228 Frederick M. Abbott, The Second Phase of North American Integration: Looking Forward in a
Period of Crisis 12 (Mar. 14, 1995 draft for presentation at Boalt Hall, Mar. 23, 1995).
229 Id. at 11.
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sense. Thus, the manufacturers may install the gamut of pollution control
equipment on autos destined for the United States and Canada (a bit less than forty-
five percent of production) and less pollution control equipment on cars destined
for the Mexican market plus the tiny portion of exports headed to Central America,
South America, and other countries (fifty-five percent of production).230 Because
the majority of the Mexican/South American production goes to Mexico, this
question boils down to how stringent Mexican emission standards are, and whether
it is economical to produce dirtier cars for Mexico. In all likelihood, such
production would be economical."'
There may be some political support for tighter vehicle air pollution control
in Mexico because of the extremely poor air quality in Mexico City. On the other
hand, consumer preferences in Mexico are likely to focus on the individual cost of
automobiles, with a preference for cheaper cars with less controls, because of lower
average per capita income than in the United States and Canada.
2. Political Power Structure: Institutional Structure and Decisionmaking Rules
Unlike the EU and the WTO, NAFTA has a single dominant member, the
United States. Canada has followed U.S. automobile emission control policy. The
United States has imposed upon Mexico the adoption of stricter environmental
laws; therefore, harmonization, including upward movement, has been, and most
likely will continue to be, driven by the United States.
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation will likely be rather weak.
Its potential for upward harmonization looks limited. Its greatest promise is to be
a vehicle (no pun intended) for the United States and Canada to encourage Mexico
to enforce its environmental laws. Because the production facilities in Mexico are
primarily operated by U.S. firms, they will be more susceptible to direct pressure
from U.S. constituencies than independent firms.
3. Conclusions
NAFTA does not promise to play an important role in upward
harmonization of motor vehicle emission standards. Upward harmonization
depends primarily upon the stringency of emission standards in the United States.
Although U.S. threats have succeeded in making Mexico put stringent laws on the
books, the general problem with environmental protection in Mexico is
enforcement.232 Under NAFTA, the United States was successful in obtaining
230 For example, between 20,000 and 30,000 cars were exported to South America in 1991 and 1992.
See WORLD MOTOR VEHICLE DATA 1994, supra note 22, at 319.
231 See Hughes Interview, supra note 186.
232 Indeed, the general problem with environmental laws in many countries, including the United
States, is enforcement. But, as a matter of degree, such laws are currently not enforced as well in
developing countries as in certain developed countries.
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Mexico's promise to improve enforcement, with U.S. monitoring.233 Also,
enforcement may not be an issue with large sophisticated automobile manufacturers
with corporate environmental goals to achieve.
In sum, environmental advocates would spend their resources most
efficiently by increasing the stringency of standards in the United States and using
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation to address specific instances of
lack of Mexican enforcement, if any. As under the WTO, manufacturers must
decide whether product differentiation between high- and low-control markets is
more profitable than achieving economies of scale through standardization of
design and process across all North American facilities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Lessons from the European Case Study
Based on this analysis, several critical factors influence a trading regime's
approach toward the tension between free trade and internal regulation and its
direction of harmonization, if any. These factors are large consumer markets,
supplier preferences, state power, domestic political support, and the structure of
the international regime and its institutions.
The approaches that the EU took to achieve upward harmonization were:
- Compromise through product differentiation, before integration was very
deep;
* Threats from the largest market and the dominant political player; there
was such a country (West Germany), and it had several motivations for
desiring "greener" standards;
- Federalization/centralization, as economic and political integration
deepened.
This article demonstrates the power of leadership by large "green" markets
with stringent standards. Dire air quality problems led to strict standards in
California. Because California was a substantial part of the U.S. market, California
standards influenced U.S. automobile emission standards. Because the United
States (and specifically California) was a large export market for West Germany in
the 1980s, German manufacturers desired harmonization of European standards
with U.S. standards.
Both California, as a significant market within the United States, and West
Germany, as a significant market within the EU, had sufficient market power to
coerce vehicle manufacturers into accepting standards which were stricter than they
would have liked or than they thought were competitively viable. In addition,
233 SEE VOGEL, supra note 14, at 262-64.
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environmental forces in both California and Germany wanted higher standards."'
Moreover, German manufacturers favored stricter standards because they had
invested heavily in production capacity to serve an even stricter regulatory regime,
California. Germany was not immediately successful in the international
negotiations in Europe but exerted strong leadership which gradually resulted in
upward harmonization.
On the other hand, small markets with stringent standards have less effect
on upward harmonization. The maverick regulations of Denmark and the
Netherlands, by themselves, were not sufficient to change the magnitude and
direction of European standards, although these moves did play a role.
B. Predictions for Other Trading Regimes
The vehicle emissions standards case in the EU demonstrates the potential
for upward harmonization of environmental standards under a highly integrated
customs union. The combination of factors resulting in upward harmonization
included potential efficiency gains for suppliers exporting to markets with stringent
standards and having powerful environmental lobbies. In addition, as the central
institutions grew in power, they took greater initiatives toward upward
harmonization.
In contrast, for members of the WTO, neither the market dynamics nor the
relatively weak WTO/GATT structure will reproduce the upward harmonization
seen in Western Europe. Instead, stringent domestic rules may be challenged by:
(1) existing major producers seeking to knock down maverick countries with high
standards, or (2) infant producers seeking to export to the more advanced countries.
Finally, under NAFTA, the United States will continue to dominate the
setting of vehicle emission standards. U.S. and Canadian standards are already
harmonized. Regarding Mexican standards, Mexico is likely to follow the U.S.
lead. Because automobile manufacturing in Mexico is operated by U.S. and Asian
firms (or joint ventures thereof), independent Mexican firms are not a significant
factor in influencing emission standards. The U.S. and Asian firms already meet
stringent standards to export to the United States. The only question is whether it
will be profitable, and desirable, to manufacture dirtier cars for the Mexican,
Central American, and South American markets. To the extent the United States
exerts pressure on Mexico to harmonize its standards, production of dirtier cars for
the Mexican market is less likely.
In the overview, upward harmonization occurs more readily when an
economically and politically strong progressive leader pushes for environmental
improvements. On the other hand, downward harmonization or lack of
harmonization is likely to occur under a loosely integrated trading scheme, when
the production leaders are not committed to upward harmonization in their product
234 The analogy probably ends there because California is just a state within a federal system, whereas
Germany is a sovereign within an increasingly integrated community.
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C. Application of the Methodology Developed in This Article
This article provides a road map for assessing the probability of
harmonization of environmental standards under various international trading
regimes for a selected economic sector.235 First, the analyst must understand the
legal structure of the trading regime and the institutional arrangements thereunder.
Next, the analyst must gather sufficient information regarding the major producers
in the sector and their markets (both domestic and foreign), along with the present
and likely future stringency of environmental regulations in those target markets.
Finally, the analyst must assess the domestic politics within the member states and
the politics between the member states. Here, the question is who has relatively
more power in what areas, and why (especially the "power" of having a large and
attractive domestic market in the sector). Taking all of these considerations
together, the analyst may make a forecast of the likely direction of harmonization
of environmental policies, if any.
In addition, the methodology and results of this article provide general
advice to participants in the policy debate. Manufacturers should assess possible
economies of scale that might be achieved under harmonized standards. These
economies could flow from common designs, standardized production and
assembly lines, substitution of products from one plant for products from another
plant to meet unexpected demand changes in particular markets, and other factors.
(Of course, a firm may conclude harmonization is not in its interest, due to its
limited ability to pass increased costs per vehicle onto consumers.)
Environmentalists should strive to obtain stringent standards in large
markets for the product. Strict standards in these markets will facilitate upward
harmonization where firms desire to serve these markets. For example, the
influence of California air quality standards over standards in North America and
Europe has been profound. While high standards in small markets (such as
Denmark) exert some upward force, when environmentalists must choose where to
spend their scarce resources, they may achieve the most success by focusing on
policies in large markets.
23 By an "economic sector," a product-group market is meant, such as automobiles or food products.
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APPENDIX TABLE A- I: BASIC EMISSION STANDARDS FOR PASSENGER CARS 236
(incomplete; variations and waivers omitted)
Carbon Monoxide HC NO, Combined Combined
HC + NO, HC + NO,
U.S. EC U.S. U.S. U.S. EC
49-state 49-state 49-state 49-state
Year g/km g/km g/km g/km g/km g/km
No std. 50.40 6.36 2.46 8.82
1968 20.40 2.46 No std. 2.46
1969 20.40 2.46 No std. 2.46
1970 20.40 2.46 No std. 2.46
1971 20.40 2.46 No std. 2.46
1972 16.80 1.80 1.86 3.66
1973 16.80 1.80 1.86 3.66
1974 16.80 1.80 1.86 3.66
1975 9.00 0.90 1.86 2.76
1976 9.00 0.90 1.86 2.76
1977 9.00 0.90 1.20 2.10
1978 9.00 0.90 1.20 2.10
/
1979 9.00 0.90 1.20 2.10
1980 4.20 0.25 1.20 1.45
1981 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1982 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1983 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1984 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1985 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1986 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1987 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
236 Data incomplete due to difficulties in calculation. European standards have been expressed in terms
not easily convertible to grams per kilometer. It was not possible within the time available for this
research to make a complete year-by-year comparison.
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Carbon Monoxide HC NO Combined Combined
HC + NO, HC + NO.
U.S. EC U.S. U.S. U.S. EC
Year 49-state 49-state 49-state 49-state
glkm g/km g/km g/km glkm g/km
1988 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1989 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1990 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1991 2.04 0.25 0.60 0.85
1992 2.04 2.72 0.25 0.60 0.85 0.97
1993 2.72 0.97
1994 2.72 0.97
1995 2.72 0.97
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APPENDIX FIGURE A- 1: EMISSION STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES/
EUROPEAN UNION, 1970-1996237
(Relative to 1970 Baseline Emission Standard)
Emission Levels from
New Passenger Cars in Europe
Emission
Levels (6/)
F NOx
HCs
Oct Oct Oc
1975 1977Oc Jul- Jan-
1979 1984 88- 92 96
91
EU Directives
(Dates of Enforcement)
237 Modified from figure accompanying Drivefor the Clean, Lean Car, supra note 1. (Graphic by
Anne Kelleher)
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